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Abstract
A new family of cost sharing rules for cost sharing problems is pro-
posed. This family generalizes the family of α-serial cost sharing rules
(Albizuri, 2010) which contains the serial cost sharing rule (Moulin and
Shenker, 1992) among others. Every rule of the family is characterized by
means of two properties.
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1 Introduction
Cost sharing problems arise in many real life situations, which include the pro-
duction of private goods by a group of people using a jointly owned production
facility, the allocation of overhead expenses of a company among its divisions or
charging individuals for any service that may be provided for groups of people.
In all such situations each of the individuals involved, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, demand
a quantity, qi, of the output and the cost of producing the jointly demanded
amount, C(
∑
i∈N qi), has to be paid by the individuals. Cost sharing rules
associate each demand profile, (q1, . . . , qn), with a sharing of the overall cost.
In this paper we introduce a family of rules which is related to the serial
cost sharing rule defined by Moulin and Shenker (1992). Since its origin the
serial cost sharing rule has caught great attention and several related rules
have been defined. Inter alia we can mention the decreasing serial mechanism
defined by de Frutos (1998), the mixed cost sharing introduced by Hougaard
and Thorlund-Petersen (2001), and the concave serial rule and the convex serial
rule introduced by Koster (2002). There are also generalizations of the serial
cost sharing rule to heterogeneous cost sharing models (Koster, 2006, 2007) and
when agents require bundle of goods (Koster et al., 1998).
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Being more precise, in this paper we introduce a generalization of the α-serial
cost sharing rule defined by Albizuri (2010). This latter rule can be seen as a
combination of the serial cost sharing rule (Moulin and Shenker, 1992) and the
the dual serial cost sharing rule (Albizuri and Zarzuelo, 2007). The parameter
α tells us how this combination is made.
We describe the α-serial cost sharing rule with only two agents, i and j.
Assume that qi ≤ qj . When the production of the output starts, each unit
is equally divided between the agents until i receives qi, at this point he has
received his entire demand. Agent i leaves the picture and the cost of the
produced amount (that is, of 2qi) is divided in the following way. Agents i and
j pay a portion of 2qi (precisely α2qi) taking into account the cost increment
associated with this portion. So both i and j pay C (α2qi) /2 and the rest
((1 − α)2qi) is paid by both agents taking into account the cost increment of
this quantity to quantities to be produced (with respect to qi + qj). Therefore,
both i and j pay C(qi+qj)−C(qi+qj−(1−α)2qi)2 for the rest. Hence, in total agent
i pays C(α2qi)+C(qi+qj)−C(qi+qj−(1−α)2qi)2 . Agent j pays in addition the rest of
the production, that is, j pays in addition C (qi + qj − (1− α) 2qi)− C (α2qi).
By generalizing this procedure to n agents, the α-serial cost sharing rule is
obtained (the explicit definition is presented in the preliminaries). If α ∈ (0, 1),
by means of this allocation rule, agents with low demands have to pay cost
increments associated with low outputs and cost increments associated with high
outputs. Since the quantity of low outputs is determined by parameter α (and
therefore, the quantity of high outputs as well), the proportion fixed by α does
not depend on the quantities demanded by the agents. In this paper we allow for
the possibility of taking different proportions for different demands. For doing
so, instead of taking a parameter α ∈ [0, 1] we take a function a : R+ → R+ that
determines the proportion for each production level. The resulting cost sharing
rule is called the a-serial cost sharing rule.
For example, suppose that the cost increment in high demands is very high
and that there are two agents with low demands such that the agent with
the lowest demand has hardly contributed to the total demand of all agents
in comparison with the other agent. Then, it might be sensible to allocate a
greater proportion of the cost associated with low demands to the agent with
less demand. As another example, we can suppose that the cost increment in
high demands is higher than in small ones and that there are two agents with
low demands, but now the second one not having contributed so much to high
demands. In this case, it could be sensible to allocate a smaller proportion of
the cost of high demands to the second agent, since otherwise he would pay a
great portion of the cost of high demands.
In this paper we characterize the a-serial cost sharing rule by means of two
properties. Namely, Anonymity and a generalization of the Independence of
higher demands used by Moulin and Shenker (1992) to characterize the serial
cost sharing rule.
We would like to point out that in this paper we introduce a family of cost
sharing rules. Different functions a : R+ → R+ will give rise to different a-
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serial cost sharing rules. At the end of the paper we present precisely different
examples to better understand our new rules.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After some preliminaries in
Section 2, we define the a-serial cost sharing rule in Section 3 and in Section 4
we characterize the a-serial cost sharing rules. Finally, we illustrate the use of
the rules by several examples.
2 Preliminaries
A cost sharing problem is a triple (N, q, C) where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set
of agents, q ∈ Rn+ = {x ∈ Rn : xi ≥ 0} is the vector of demands or demand
profile and C : R+ → R is a nondecreasing function such that C(0) = 0, where
R+ = {x ∈ R : x ≥ 0}. Notice that there may be several homogeneous goods
or a single good with demands of a number of agents. We denote by CN the
set of all cost sharing problems with player set N and by C the set of all such
problems with an arbitrary set of players. We also write Q =
∑
i∈N qi to ease
notation.
A cost sharing rule is a mapping f associating to each cost sharing problem,
a vector of cost shares, i.e., f : CN → Rn+ such that∑
i∈N
fi(N, q, C) = C(Q). (Efficiency)
In Albizuri (2010), the α-serial cost sharing rule, ϕα, is proposed and char-
acterized. The α-serial cost sharing rule generalizes several cost sharing rules in
the literature. For instance, if α = 1 it coincides with the serial cost sharing rule
of Moulin and Shenker (1992), if α = 0 then ϕα is the dual serial cost sharing
rule (Albizuri and Zarzuelo, 2007), and when α = 1/2 it turns out to be the self
dual serial cost sharing rule proposed by Albizuri (2009).
Formally, let (N, q, C) ∈ C such that q1 ≤ q2 ≤ · · · ≤ qn and α ∈ [0, 1].
Define,
q0 = 0, q1 = nq1, q
2 = q1 + (n− 1)q2, . . .
qi = q1 + · · ·+ qi−1 + (n+ 1− i)qi, . . . , qn = Q.
(1)
The α-serial cost sharing rule, ϕα, is given for each i ∈ N by
ϕαi (N, q, C)
=
i∑
j=1
C(αqj)− C(αqj−1)
n− j + 1 +
i∑
j=1
C(Q− (1− α)qj−1)− C(Q− (1− α)qj)
n− j + 1 .
The cost sharing rule consists of two terms, the first one is based on the cost
increments of the quantities produced (where α determines the portion taken
into account) and the second one on the cost increments of the quantities left
to produce.
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The serial cost sharing rule of Moulin and Shenker (1992) is characterized
by means of two properties. The first one, Anonymity, states that the labeling
of the agents should not affect the cost sharing. The second one, the so called
Independence of higher demands requires that the payoff of an agent does not
depend on demands which are higher than his own. Formally, let q, p ∈ Rn+ such
that p1 ≤ p2 ≤ · · · ≤ pn, p ≤ q, and i ∈ N such that pj = qj for every j ≤ i,
then a cost sharing rule f satisfies Independence of higher demands if,
fi(N, q, C) = fi(N, p,C).
Given a demands profile q, if the agents with greater demand than agent i’s
decrease their demands, then the demands profile becomes p. This property
requires that the saved cost, that is, C(Q) − C(P ), should only affect those
agents who have decreased their demand. Therefore, the production costs on
the interval [P,Q] do not affect agent i’s payoff.
The α-serial cost sharing rule of Albizuri (2010) is characterized by means
of three properties. The Anonymity property described above. Scale invari-
ance, which states that the scale by which the good is measured should not
affect agents payoffs. And a modification of Independence of higher demands
introduced by Albizuri (2010).
When we ask for Independence of higher demands, if the demand profile
changes from p to q, the agents with greater demand than agent i’s have to
pay the cost increment associated with [P,Q]. But this might not always be
desirable. On the one hand, this cost increment could be the highest one among
all the cost increments associated with Q − P outputs and therefore it could
be sensible to allocate this increment also to the agents with lower demands.
Consider for instance, a two agents cost sharing problem where the first few
units are free and the next units have a given unitary cost. As an example, let
N = {1, 2}, p = (3, 3), q = (3, 5), and C(x) = max{x − 6, 0}. If Independence
of higher demands holds then agent 2 pays the last two units and agent 1 pays
nothing. This could be not sensible since the stand-alone cost of both agents is
0 and the non zero cost arises when both agents are present. On the other hand,
consider another situation in which the cost increment associated with [P,Q] is
very low and therefore it could be reasonable to allocate it to all agents, since
all of them have contributed to this low cost increment. As an example, take
N = {1, 2}, p = (3, 3), q = (3, 5), and C(x) = min{x, 6}.
The modification of Independence of higher demands by Albizuri (2010)
reflects these alternative situations, and agent i can also pay for the increment
C(Q) − C(P ). According to the modified property, agents who change their
demand do not have to pay C(Q)−C(P ) less for asking for Q−P less but a cost
increment associated with an intermediate interval in [0, Q]. This intermediate
interval is denoted by [a(P ), a(P )+Q−P ], where a is a mapping from R+ to R+
which satisfies a(P ) ≤ P . Therefore, in the modified property the production
costs on the interval [a(P ), a(P ) +Q− P ] do not affect agent i’s payoff.
To formalize this property we consider the following cost function obtained
from the original one when an interval of length K is deleted at point λ pre-
serving the continuity.
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Cλ,K(t) =
{
C(t) if t ≤ λ
C(t+K)− C(λ+K) + C(λ) if t ≥ λ.
Let f be a cost sharing rule. We say that f satisfies a-Independence of
higher demands if there exists a mapping a : R+ → R+ with a(P ) ∈ [0, P ] for
all P ∈ R+ such that for every (N, q, C), (N, p,C) ∈ C with p1 ≤ p2 ≤ · · · ≤ pn,
for which there is an i ∈ N such that pj = qj for every j ≤ i and p ≤ q, it holds
fi(N, q, C) = fi(N, p,C
a(P ),Q−P ).
Observe that if a cost sharing rule f satisfies a-Independence of higher de-
mands then this property determines one function a : R+ → R+ with a(P ) ∈
[0, P ] for which the required equalities are satisfied.
Notice also that when a(P ) = P , then a-Independence of higher demands
coincides with Independence of higher demands.
When the three properties, Anonymity, Scale invariance, and a-Independence
of higher demands are considered together, then a(P ) = αP for some α ∈ [0, 1],
that is, the function a : R+ → R+ is linear.
3 The a-serial cost sharing rule
We seek for a generalization of the α-serial cost sharing rule of Albizuri (2010),
by considering a more general function a : R+ → R+ than the linear a(x) = αx
with α ∈ [0, 1]. Following the idea behind the α-serial cost sharing rule, suppose
x is to be produced. Then, a(x) is paid taking into account the cost increment
associated with this quantity and the remaining x − a(x) is paid taking into
account the quantities left to produce.
First of all, the procedure that gives rise to the a-serial cost sharing rule
is described. Afterwards, the conditions that the mapping a has to satisfy in
order to obtain a cost sharing rule are discussed. Let (N, q, C) ∈ C such that
q1 ≤ q2 ≤ · · · ≤ qn. The a-serial cost sharing rule is defined as follows.
When the production starts each unit is divided equally among the agents,
who equally share the cost incurred. When q1 = nq1 is produced the first
agent has fulfilled his demand and stops receiving more. Then, a(q1) is paid by
all the agents by means of cost increments associated with this quantity, and
q1−a(q1) is paid by all the agents, but now taking into account cost increments
of quantities left to produce. Hence, each agent pays
C(a(q1))− C(0)
n
+
C(Q)− C(Q− (q1 − a(q1)))
n
.
At this point the first agents drops out.
Now, the rest of the good is shared among the remaining n−1 agents until the
second agent’s demand has been met. This happens when q2 = (n−1)q2+q1 has
been produced. As before, quantities produced and quantities left to produce are
considered. So, the remaining agents share the cost increment associated with
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quantities a(q1) and a(q2) and the cost increment associated with quantities
Q− (q1 − a(q1)) and Q− (q2 − a(q2)). Thus, the remaining n− 1 players also
pay
C(a(q2))− C(a(q1))
n− 1 +
C(Q− (q1 − a(q1)))− C(Q− (q2 − a(q2)))
n− 1 .
Next, the second player drops out and the process continues until all agents
obtain the demanded amount.
Formally, let a : R+ → R+ and (N, q, C) ∈ C such that q1 ≤ q2 ≤ · · · ≤ qn.
Let q1, q2, . . . , qn be as defined in (1). Then, the a-serial cost sharing rule, ϕa,
is given for every i ∈ N by,
ϕai (N, q, C) =
i∑
j=1
C(a(qj))− C(a(qj−1))
n− j + 1
+
i∑
j=1
C(Q− (qj−1 − a(qj−1)))− C(Q− (qj − a(qj)))
n− j + 1 .
(2)
We consider the following conditions that the mapping a should satisfy in
order to obtain a cost sharing rule following the procedure described above.
a(x) ≤ x for every x ∈ R+. (3)
a(x) ≤ a(y) for every 0 ≤ x ≤ y. (4)
a(y)− a(x) ≤ y − x for every 0 ≤ x ≤ y. (5)
Note that condition (3) requires the image of any quantity under a to be a
portion of that quantity. The second one, (4), requires a to be nondecreasing.
Finally, condition (5) states that the increment rate of a with respect to any
point is never bigger than one. Note that if a is derivable and satisfies (4),
condition (5) is equivalent to the slope of a being smaller than one. It can be
easily checked that any map a : R+ → R+ that satisfies (4) and (5) is continuous.
Proposition 3.1. The right hand side of (2) defines a cost sharing rule if and
only if the mapping a : R+ → R+ satisfies conditions (3), (4), and (5).
Proof. It is straightforward to prove the sufficiency of the three conditions.
So, let us prove the necessity. Let a : R+ → R+ be a mapping and let ϕa be as
defined in (2).
(i) If a does not satisfy condition (3), then there exists x ∈ R+ such that
a(x) > x. Let q1 ∈ R+ be such that nq1 = x and qn ∈ R+ be such that
x + qn − q1 > a(x). Consider the demand profile q = (q1, . . . , q1, qn) ∈ Rn+ and
the cost function C(t) =
{
0 t ≤ Q
1 t > Q
. Then, from (2) we have
ϕa1(N, q, C) =
C(a(x))
n
+
C(Q)− C(Q− (x− a(x)))
n
=
−1
n
,
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since a(x) < Q = x+ qn − q1 < Q− (x− a(x)). Hence, ϕa is not a cost sharing
rule.
(ii) If a does not satisfy condition (4), then there exist x, y ∈ R+ such that
x < y and a(x) > a(y). Let q1, q2, qn ∈ R+ such that nq1 = x, q1+(n−1)q2 = y,
and qn > q2. Consider the demand profile q = (q1, q2, . . . , q2, qn) ∈ Rn+ and the
cost function C(t) =
{
0 t ≤ a(y)
1 t > a(y)
. Notice that q1 = x, q2 = y, and q1 < q2.
Then, from (2) we have
ϕa2(N, q, C) =
C(a(x))
n
+
C(Q)− C(Q− (x− a(x)))
n
+
C(a(y))− C(a(x))
n− 1
+
C(Q− (x− a(x)))− C(Q− (y − a(y)))
n− 1 =
1
n
− 1
n− 1 ,
since a(y) < a(x) < x < y, Q− (x− a(x)) > a(x) > a(y), and Q− (y − a(y)) >
a(y). Hence, ϕa is not a cost sharing rule.
(iii) If condition (5) does not hold, then there exist x, y ∈ R+ such that
x < y and a(y) − a(x) > y − x. As before, let q1, q2 ∈ R+ such that nq1 = x
and q1 + (n − 1)q2 = y. This time, let qn ∈ R+ such that a(y) − a(x) ≤
(n−2)(q2−q1)+qn−q1. Consider the demand profile q = (q1, q2, . . . , q2, qn) ∈ Rn+
and the cost function C(t) =
{
0 t ≤ Q− x+ a(x)
1 t > Q− x+ a(x) . Then, from (2) we have
ϕa2(N, q, C) =
C(a(x))
n
+
C(Q)− C(Q− (x− a(x)))
n
+
C(a(y))− C(a(x))
n− 1 +
C(Q− (x− a(x)))− C(Q− (y − a(y)))
n− 1 =
1
n
− 1
n− 1 ,
since a(x) < a(y) ≤ Q−x+a(x) < Q−y+a(y) implies that all the costs above
are zero with the exception of C(Q) = C(Q− y+ a(y)) = 1. Hence, ϕa is not a
cost sharing rule. 
It can be easily checked that ϕa(N, q, C) = ϕa
′
(N, q, C) for all (N, q, C) ∈ C
if and only if a = a′.
Notice that in this paper we define a family of cost sharing rules. One rule
for each a : R+ → R+ that satisfies (3), (4), and (5).
4 Characterization of the a-serial cost sharing rule
In this section, we characterize each a-serial cost sharing rule. The a-serial cost
sharing rule is characterized by means of Anonymity and a-Independence of
higher demands. As a result of that, eventually the a-serial cost sharing rule,
defined on page 6, is only considered for mapppings a : R+ → R+ that are
determined by the a-Independence of higher demands property.
Next, the standard anonymity property is formally introduced. Let f be a
cost sharing rule and Π(N) the set of permutations over N .
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Anonymity. For every pi ∈ Π(N) and i ∈ N ,
fi(N, q, C) = fpi(i)(N, piq, C),
where piq ∈ Rn+ is given by (piq)i = qpi−1(i) for each i ∈ N .
Anonymity requires a rule to be independent of the order in which the players
are arranged. The second property considered is the a-Independence of higher
demands introduced in Section 2.
First let us see that these two properties imply the mapping a associated with
a-Independence of higher demands to satisfy conditions (4) and (5). Recall that
condition (3) is required in the definition of a-Independence of higher demands.
Lemma 4.1. Let f be a cost sharing rule that satisfies Anonymity and a-
Independence of higher demands. Then, the mapping a : R+ → R+ satisfies
conditions (4) and (5).
Proof. (i) If a does not satisfy condition (4), then there exist x, y ∈ R+
such that x < y and a(x) > a(y). Let q1, q2 ∈ R+ such that nq1 = x and
nq1 < y < (n− 1)q1 + q2. Let also
C(t) =

0 if t < a(x)
t− a(x) if a(x) ≤ t ≤ a(x) + q2 − q1
q2 − q1 else
.
Let N = {1, . . . , n} and q = (q1, . . . , q1, q2) ∈ Rn+. We are assuming that f is a
cost sharing rule satisfying Anonymity and a-Independence of higher demands,
then
f1(N, q, C) = f1(N, (q1, ..., q1), C
a(x),q2−q1) =
Ca(x),q2−q1(x)
n
.
Since a satisfies condition (3),
Ca(x),q2−q1(x) = C((n− 1)q1 + q2)− C(a(x) + q2 − q1) + C(a(x)) = 0.
Thus,
f1(N, q, C) = 0. (6)
Next, let q′2 be such that (n− 1)q1 + q′2 = y and D = Ca(y),q2−q
′
2 . Observe that
q1 < q
′
2 < q2, then
Da(x),q
′
2−q1(x) = D(y)−D(a(x) + q′2 − q1) +D(a(x))
= C(y + q2 − q′2)− C(a(y) + q2 − q′2) + C(a(y))
− C(a(x) + q2 − q1) + C(a(y) + q2 − q′2)− C(a(y))
+ C(a(x) + q2 − q′2)− C(a(y) + q2 − q′2) + C(a(y)),
(7)
where the first equality follows from a(x) ≤ x and the second equality holds
because a(y) < y, a(y) < a(x) + q′2 − q1, and a(y) < a(x). Next, simplifying eq.
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(7)
Da(x),q
′
2−q1(x) = C(y + q2 − q′2)− C(a(x) + q2 − q1)
+ C(a(x) + q2 − q′2)− C(a(y) + q2 − q′2) + C(a(y))
= (q2 − q1)− (q2 − q1) + (q2 − q′2)− C(a(y) + q2 − q′2) + 0
= q2 − q′2 − C(a(y) + q2 − q′2),
where the second equality holds since y+ q2− q′2 = x+ q2− q1 ≥ a(x) + q2− q1,
a(x) + q2 − q′2 < a(x) + q2 − q1, and a(y) < a(x). Hence, taking into account
that a(y) + q2 − q′2 < a(x) + q2 − q1 two cases may arise,
Da(x),q
′
2−q1(x) =
{
a(x)− a(y) if a(y) + q2 − q′2 ≥ a(x)
q2 − q′2 otherwise
In any case Da(x),q
′
2−q1(x) > 0. On the other hand, applying a-Independence of
higher demands twice,
f1(N, q, C) = f1(N, (q1, . . . , q1, q
′
2), D) = f1(N, (q1, . . . , q1), D
a(x),q′2−q1)
Again, by Anonymity and Efficiency,
f1(N, (q1, . . . , q1), D
a(x),q′2−q1) =
Da(x),q
′
2−q1(x)
n
> 0.
The last equation contradicts eq. (6). Hence, a must be nondecreasing.
(ii) Suppose that there exist x, y ∈ R+ such that x < y and a(y) − a(x) >
y − x. As before, let 0 ≤ q1 < q′2 < q2 such that nq1 = x and (n− 1) q1 + q′2 =
y < (n− 1) q1+q2, and let C be the cost function defined above but with respect
to these new q1 and q2. We argue as before and reach eq. (6) only by assuming
that f is a cost sharing rule satisfying Anonymity and a-Independence of higher
demands, and that a satisfies condition (3). Finally, let D be defined as before.
Then, by the hypothesis and the fact that a satisfies (4),
Da(x),q
′
2−q1(x) = D(y)−D(a(x) + q′2 − q1) +D(a(x))
= C((n−1)q1 + q2)−C(a(y) + q2− q′2) +C(a(y))−C(a(x) + q′2− q1) +C(a(x))
= q2 − q1 − q2 + q1 + C(a(y))− q′2 + q1 = C(a(y))− q′2 + q1 > 0.
As before, by Anonymity and Efficiency we have
f1(N, (q1, . . . , q1), D
a(x),q′2−q1) > 0,
which contradicts eq. (6). 
Lemma 4.2. The a-serial cost sharing rule satisfies Anonymity and a-Indepen-
dence of higher demands.
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Proof. It is straightforward to check that the a-serial cost sharing rule
satisfies Anonymity. To prove that it also satisfies a-Independence of higher
demands, let (N, p,C), (N, q, C) ∈ C and i ∈ N such that p1 ≤ p2 ≤ · · · ≤ pn,
pj = qj for every j ≤ i and p ≤ q. Let j ≤ i, then since a satisfies condition (4),
Ca(P ),Q−P (a(pj)) = C(a(qj)),
which implies that
Ca(P ),Q−P (a(pj))− Ca(P ),Q−P (a(pj−1)) = C(a(qj))− C(a(qj−1)). (8)
Next, by condition (5) and the fact that a satisfies condition (3),
Ca(P ),Q−P (P−(pj−a(pj))) = C(Q−(qj−a(qj)))−C(Q+a(P )−P )+C(a(P )),
from which we have
C(Q− (qj−1 − a(qj−1)))− C(Q− (qj − a(qj)))
= Ca(P ),Q−P (P − (pj−1 − a(pj−1)))− Ca(P ),Q−P (P − (pj − a(pj))) (9)
By definition of ϕa and eq.s (8) and (9), ϕai (N, q, C) = ϕai (N, p,Ca(P ),Q−P )
which concludes the proof. 
Theorem 4.3. A cost sharing rule f satisfies Anonymity and a-Independence
of higher demands if and only if f = ϕa.
Proof. From Lemma 4.2 we know that ϕa satisfies the properties. For
the converse, let f be a cost sharing rule that satisfies Anonymity and a-
Independence of higher demands. Then, the mapping a satisfies condition (3) by
a-Independence of higher demands. Moreover, from Lemma 4.1 we know that
a also satisfies conditions (4) and (5). Hence, ϕa is properly defined. For any
(N, q, C) ∈ C with q1 ≤ q2 ≤ · · · ≤ qn we will see that fi(N, q, C) = ϕai (N, q, C)
by induction on i.
If i = 1, let p = (q1, . . . , q1). Then, by a-Independence of higher demands,
fi(N, q, C) = f1(N, p,C
a(P ),Q−P ) =
1
n
Ca(q
1),Q−q1(q1)
=
C(Q)− C(Q+ a(q1)− q1) + C(a(q1))
n
= ϕai (N, q, C),
where the second equality follows from the Anonymity and Efficiency of f and
using the definitions and condition (3) in the remaining equalities.
Next, by the induction hypothesis assume that fj(N, q, C) = ϕaj (N, q, C) for
every j < i and we will prove that fi(N, q, C) = ϕai (N, q, C).
Let p = (q1, q2, . . . , qi, . . . , qi) ∈ Rn+. By a-Independence of higher demands,
fi(N, q, C) = fi(N, p,C
a(qi),Q−qi).
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Next, since f satisfies Anonymity we have that for every j ≥ i,
fj(N, p,C
a(qi),Q−qi) = fi(N, p,Ca(q
i),Q−qi).
Applying Efficiency and the induction hypothesis we can write
fi(N, p,C
a(qi),Q−qi) =
Ca(q
i),Q−qi(qi)−∑j<i ϕaj (N, q, C)
n− i+ 1
=
C(Q)− C(Q+ a(qi)− qi) + C(a(qi))−∑j<i ϕaj (N, q, C)
n− i+ 1 , (10)
where the second equality follows from a(qi) ≤ qi.
In what follows, we show the last expression of eq. (10) equals ϕai (N, q, C).
Indeed, by definition of ϕa∑
j<i
ϕaj (N, q, C) =
i− 1
n
C(Q)
+
(
i− 1
n
− i− 2
n− 1
)[
C(a(q1))− C(Q− (q1 − a(q1)))]
+ · · ·+
(
2
n− i+ 3 −
1
n− i+ 2
)[
C(a(qi−2))− C(Q− (qi−2 − a(qi−2)))]
+
1
n+ 2− i
[
C(a(qi−1))− C(Q− (qi−1 − a(qi−1)))]
=
i− 1
n
C(Q) + (n− i+ 1)
[
C(a(q1))− C(Q− (q1 − a(q1)))
n(n− 1)
+ · · ·+ C(a(q
i−1))− C(Q− (qi−1 − a(qi−1)))
(n− i+ 2)(n− i+ 1)
]
.
Pluging the expression above in eq. (10) we obtain
fi(N, p,C
a(qi),Q−qi) =
C(Q)
n
+
C(a(qi))− C(Q+ a(qi))− qi)
n− i+ 1
+
C(Q+ a(q1)− q1)− C(a(q1))
n(n− 1) + · · ·+
C(Q+ a(qi−1)− qi−1)− C(a(qi−1))
(n− i+ 2)(n− i+ 1)
= ϕai (N, q, C),
where the last equality follows by definition of ϕa and the proof concludes. 
Remark 4.4. We could have considered a slightly weaker version of a-Indepen-
dence of higher demands to characterize the a-serial cost sharing rule since
condition (3) could be omitted. It can be proved that if a cost sharing rule f
satisfies Anonymity and a-Independence of higher demands, being a : R+ → R+
an arbitrary mapping, then f also satisfies a∗-Independence of higher demands
where a∗ : R+ → R+ is defined by
a∗(x) =
{
a(x) if a (x) ≤ x
x otherwise.
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Therefore, condition (3) would be a consequence of the properties.
Remark 4.5. Let (N, q, C) and a1, a2 : R+ → R+ such that a1 (x) ≤ a2 (x) if
x ≤ Q. Since a1 (x) and a2 (x) determine the portion paid by the agents with
respect to the quantities produced, if the cost function C is convex on [0, Q],
then agents with lower demands will prefer the a2-serial cost sharing rule to the
a1-serial cost sharing rule, and if the cost function C is concave, then agents
with higher demands will prefer the a1-serial cost sharing rule to the a2-serial
cost sharing rule.
Example 4.6. Consider the following cost sharing problems studied by Moulin
and Shenker (1994): (N, q, C1), (N, q, C2) ∈ C, where N = {1, 2, 3}, q = (3, 5, 7),
C1(p) = max{p − 10, 0}, and C2(p) = min{p, 9 + 0.1p}. With C1, the first 10
units are free and the next ones cost 1 each. While with C2, the first 10 units cost
1 each and the next ones cost 0.1 each. Table 1 depicts the sharing proposed by
the a-serial cost sharing rule for the following examples of a functions: a1 (x) = x
(the serial cost sharing rule), a2(x) = 0.75x (the 0.75-serial cost sharing rule)
a3 (x) =
{
0.75x if x ≤ 9,
0.5x+ 2.25 if x ≥ 9,
a4 (x) = 0.5x (the self dual serial cost sharing rule), and a5 (x) = 0 (the dual
serial cost sharing rule).
C1 C2
a1 (0, 1.5, 3.5) (3, 3.65, 3.85)
a2 (0.75, 1.25, 3) (2.325, 3.875, 4.2)
a3 (0.75, 1.75, 2.5) (2.325, 3.425, 4.75)
a4 (1.5, 1.75, 1.75) (1.65, 3.425, 5.425)
a5 (1.67, 1.67, 1.67) (1.5, 3.5, 5.5)
Table 1: Comparison of cost sharing rules of the a-serial family
In the first problem, (N, q, C1), it is reasonable to think that player 1 should
pay more than his share according to a1, which is nothing. But also that he
should pay less than what a4 and a5 prescribe. The sharing according to a3 can
be seen as a compromise in this sense. Notice that player 1 takes less free units
with a3 than with a1, and more free units than with a4 and a5. On the other
hand, the non linearity of a3 makes player 2 contribute a bit more than what
he would have to pay with a2.
The contrary happens in problem (N, q, C2). In this situation it is reasonable
to think that player 1 pays too much with a1 and too few both with a4 and with
a5. Again, a3 can be seen as a compromise. The reason behind the assertion
above is that player 1 takes less units of cost 1 each with a3 than with a1, and
more units of cost 1 than with a4 and a5. Finally, the non linearity of a3 makes
player 2 pay not so much as with a2.
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